by Ariane Denise

Abstract

This report examines the complex ways in which China’s extensive distant water fishing (DWF) and land-based mineral extraction activities, alongside Japan’s distinct, albeit less directly implicated, resource engagement and trade policies, contribute to poverty, food insecurity, and communal conflicts across Africa. China’s approach, often characterised by illicit practices, a lack of transparency, and direct support to armed groups, directly exacerbates poverty and fuels instability by depleting vital resources and undermining local livelihoods. While Japan’s engagement, primarily through development cooperation and strategic partnerships, aims to foster growth, it also faces criticism for its transactional nature and for contributing to resource pressures, thus indirectly impacting the continent’s vulnerabilities. The report concludes that the interplay of external resource interests, weak governance, and pre-existing internal fragility collectively intensifies poverty and conflict dynamics throughout Africa.

II. Introduction: Africa’s Resource Paradox and External Economic Influence

Africa, a continent endowed with immense natural resources, including vast mineral deposits and rich marine ecosystems, paradoxically grapples with pervasive poverty, profound inequality, and persistent conflict. This phenomenon, often referred to as the “resource curse,” describes how the abundance of natural wealth can hinder economic growth, perpetuate disparities, and undermine effective governance. This paradox is deeply rooted in historical colonial exploitation, where European powers extracted Africa’s wealth with limited investment in local economies, establishing a legacy of dependency on raw material exports and foreign corporations that continues to shape economic structures today. The competition for vital natural materials such as oil, water, land, and minerals is a significant driver of armed conflict, frequently intertwined with ethnic animosities and historical grievances. Indeed, armed violence often serves as a mechanism for powerful actors to control resources and ensure their extraction for external benefit.

Against this backdrop, China and Japan have emerged as prominent external economic actors in Africa, each with distinct approaches to resource engagement and trade. China has rapidly become Africa’s largest trading partner and creditor, with bilateral trade surpassing $295 billion in 2024. Its development finance to the continent reached an estimated $170.08 billion between 2000 and 2022. Chinese firms undertook 31% of all major African infrastructure projects in 2022, significantly outpacing Western counterparts, and maintain a notable presence in 78 ports across 32 African countries as builders, financiers, or operators.

Japan, while having a smaller economic footprint, maintains a significant presence, with Japan-Africa trade at $24 billion in 2024. Its engagement is largely channelled through the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), a multilateral platform focused on development cooperation, private sector assistance, and social programs. Japan expresses an aim to move “beyond traditional aid models” toward “solution-oriented and business-driven partnerships”.

This report specifically analyses how the tariff policies and sea resource grabbing activities (fishing and sea minerals) of China and Japan contribute to exacerbating poverty and fuelling communal and tribal warfare in Africa.

A critical observation is the enduring legacy of neo-colonialism in resource exploitation. The current patterns of resource extraction and trade are not merely contemporary economic interactions but are deeply embedded within and perpetuate historical power imbalances established during traditional colonialism. China’s economic model, for instance, is described as reinforcing a “neo-colonial presence” that continues to drain the continent’s wealth. This continuity means that the challenges of poverty and conflict in resource-rich African nations are exacerbated by systemic structures that favour external actors and hinder genuine, self-directed African development.

Another important consideration is that resource scarcity, not just abundance, serves as a significant catalyst for conflict. While the “resource curse” often highlights conflicts arising from the abundance of valuable minerals that attract external exploitation and finance armed groups , the available information also points to resource

scarcity as a potent driver of conflict. For example, the scarcity of water and agricultural resources fuels prolonged communal conflicts, such as farmer-herder clashes in Ethiopia. Crucially, for marine resources, fish scarcity is identified as a dominant contributor to conflict and competition between small-scale and industrial fishers. This dual dynamic, where conflicts arise from both the abundance of valuable resources attracting external interests and the scarcity of vital everyday resources impacting local livelihoods, creates a pervasive and complex landscape of conflict and poverty.

The comparative overview below illustrates the distinct scales and focuses of China and Japan’s economic engagement in Africa.

Table 4: Comparative Overview of China and Japan’s Economic Engagement in Africa

Category	China	Japan
Bilateral Trade Volume (2024)	$295 billion	$24 billion
Total Development Finance/Aid (2000-2022)	$170.08 billion	$30 billion pledge (2022-2025)
Key Engagement Platforms	FOCAC (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation)	TICAD (Tokyo International Conference on African Development)
Primary Focus of Engagement	Infrastructure (31% of major projects) , Critical Minerals , Distant Water Fishing (40% global)	Economic Development, Private Sector, Social Programs, Peace/Security , Critical Minerals (emerging interest)
Noted Criticisms/Challenges	Predatory lending, lack of transparency, Chinese labor preference, neo-colonial presence	Outdated, transactional, lack of long-term sustainability/local capacity

This table provides an immediate, high-level comparative context for the roles of China and Japan in Africa. It allows for a quick grasp of the significant differences in the scale and nature of engagement between the two countries, which is fundamental to understanding their distinct impacts on African poverty and conflict. Placing this information early in the report sets the stage by providing quantitative and qualitative benchmarks that inform the subsequent detailed analysis of each country’s activities. It also visually underscores that while China’s engagement is larger and often criticised for exploitative practices, Japan’s approach, though smaller, also faces critiques regarding its effectiveness and alignment with African self-reliance, preventing a simplistic “good versus bad” narrative. This distinction reinforces that China’s impact is generally more direct and severe in terms of fuelling poverty and conflict, while Japan’s is more nuanced and often less directly implicated in the negative aspects.

III. China’s Expanding Footprint: Tariffs, Fishing, and Mineral Extraction

China’s extensive economic engagement with Africa, while bringing considerable investment and infrastructure development, also presents significant challenges. These challenges are particularly evident through its distant water fishing operations and its dominant role in critical mineral extraction, both of which are directly linked to exacerbating poverty and fuelling conflict across the continent.

A. Trade and Tariff Dynamics

China’s position as Africa’s largest trading partner and creditor means its economic policies exert substantial influence on the continent. A notable example is China’s “zero-tariff” proposal for taxable items from 53 African countries, announced at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). This initiative is presented as a significant opportunity for industrial job creation and trade diversification in Africa.

However, this seemingly beneficial trade incentive carries inherent dependency challenges. The proposal risks creating competition among African states and perpetuating an economic dependency on commodity-based trade models rather than fostering genuine developmental change. The underlying structure of China’s trade policies, despite apparent benefits like tariff reductions, is observed to risk perpetuating Africa’s role as a raw material supplier and a consumer of Chinese manufactured goods. This can hinder the development of diversified, value-added African industries, deepen economic reliance, and potentially create internal economic disparities and competition among African nations, thereby contributing indirectly to the underlying conditions of poverty and vulnerability that can fuel instability.

Furthermore, broader global trade tensions, such as the US-China tariff disputes, have far-reaching ramifications across the global economy, affecting industrial supply chains and demand for commodities like copper and oil. While these tensions do not involve direct tariffs imposed by China on African goods, African economies are heavily reliant on commodity exports. This reliance makes them highly susceptible to the ripple effects of trade disputes between major global powers. Fluctuations in global demand and prices for key commodities, triggered by external tariffs and economic uncertainty, can lead to reduced export revenues, decreased foreign investment, and economic instability in African nations. This indirect economic vulnerability can then translate into increased national poverty, reduced social spending, and heightened internal pressures that exacerbate existing grievances and contribute to conflict.

B. Distant Water Fishing (DWF) and its Socio-Economic Consequences

China operates the world’s largest distant water fishing (DWF) fleet, accounting for approximately 40% of global DWF operations. This extensive presence has profound socio-economic consequences for African coastal communities.

Chinese industrial vessels are prolific practitioners of illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, particularly the “saiko” fishing method in Ghana, which involves transshipment of illegally caught fish at sea. This practice not only drives up food prices for Ghanaians but also severely depletes fish stocks, threatening long-term sustainability. The economic dispossession is stark: IUU fishing alone costs West African coastal states an estimated $2.3 billion annually , with other estimates placing the annual loss as high as $10 billion. This illicit activity has also led to the loss of 300,000 jobs in the region’s fisheries sector.

The impact on livelihoods and food security is critical. Overfishing, largely facilitated by Chinese DWF, imperils the food security of millions, pushing local fishermen into crime, terrorism, and piracy. In West Africa, a survey revealed that 90% of Ghanaians do not believe their children will be able to depend on fishing in the future, and household hunger has increased, with women’s dietary diversity decreasing. The environmental and economic consequences of unsustainable and illegal foreign fishing create a cascading series of socio-political problems. The erosion of traditional livelihoods and food security destabilises coastal communities, increases their vulnerability to criminal elements and radicalisation, and contributes to broader regional insecurity, including piracy and forced migration flows. This transforms a localised environmental and economic problem into a complex humanitarian and security crisis with far-reaching implications for regional stability.

Governance challenges and corruption significantly enable these activities. The expansion of Chinese DWF is driven by economic opportunity and weak enforcement capacity in host nations. Many Chinese trawlers operate through Ghanaian “front companies” to circumvent national laws. This is often facilitated by “deals with front companies owned by African elites” who use the money to fund political parties, effectively buying the “freedom to continue doing what they’re doing”. This indicates a sophisticated mechanism of regulatory circumvention facilitated by corruption and weak governance. The lack of transparency and reluctance of African leaders to pressure Beijing due to fear of losing other economic support further exacerbates the problem. Chinese DWF operations are not merely exploiting existing governance weaknesses but are actively contributing to their perpetuation. By creating illicit financial flows that benefit political elites, these operations undermine legitimate fisheries management, distort local economies, and create a dependency that prevents African governments from effectively policing their own waters. This systemic corruption and lack of accountability directly fuels the cycle of resource depletion, poverty, and instability.

The declining fish populations lead to an increased frequency and severity of conflicts. West Africa is considered a “future fisheries conflict hotspot”. This includes direct clashes between small artisan fishing boats and large industrial trawlers, with reports of ramming, net damage, and water cannon use. The loss of food security can result in a “whole variety of conflicts,” potentially pushing traditional fishermen into illicit employment like drug smuggling.

Table 1: Economic Impacts of Chinese Distant Water Fishing (DWF) in West Africa

Impact Category	Statistics
Annual Financial Loss to West African Coastal States (from IUU fishing)	$2.3 billion to $10 billion
Job Losses in West African Fisheries (from IUU fishing)	300,000 jobs
Percentage of Ghanaian Trawlers with Chinese Involvement	90-95%
China’s Share of Global DWF Operations	~40%

This table quantifies the direct and substantial economic damage inflicted by Chinese DWF on West African nations. The specific monetary figures and job loss numbers make the economic impact tangible and immediately highlight the scale of financial drain and livelihood destruction, directly linking to the query’s focus on poverty. The percentages indicating China’s share of global DWF and its involvement in Ghanaian fleets clearly illustrate the significant role China plays in perpetuating this problem, reinforcing the causal connection. These statistics provide a concrete foundation for discussing the subsequent social and conflict-related impacts, showing how economic dispossession directly contributes to broader instability.

C. Mineral Extraction and Conflict Linkages

China’s involvement in Africa’s mining sector is substantial, with investments reaching US$9.76 billion by 2022, representing 23.8% of its total Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) stock in Africa. China’s share of Africa’s mine production is around 8% and has seen a 21.3% increase in Chinese-owned mines since 2019.

China’s dominance in critical minerals is particularly pronounced. It holds a 67% global market share in refined cobalt and owns or has stakes in 15 of the 19 cobalt-producing mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), accounting for almost half of the DRC’s mined cobalt output. While foreign involvement in resource-rich nations often contributes to the “resource curse,” the available information provides specific, direct evidence of Chinese complicity in perpetuating conflict. A 2016 investigation found that Chinese-owned Kun Hou Mining supplied AK-47 rifles and money to the Raia Mutomboki militia for access to a gold site. This indicates direct material support to armed groups, transforming mineral wealth into instruments of war and human rights abuses. Furthermore, Chinese nationals have been arrested for direct involvement in illegal gold mining operations and systematic money laundering in the DRC.

The DRC’s vast mineral wealth, particularly in cobalt and gold, is a significant driver of conflict. Illegal mining operations by foreign and local armed groups have fueled ongoing wars in the DRC for decades. Armed groups, including the M23 rebel group, profit by taxing, controlling, and violently enforcing access to mines, using these revenues to buy weapons and fund atrocities.

Despite immense mineral wealth, the people of the DRC remain among the poorest globally. Local communities receive minimal benefits from the mining sector, facing poor working conditions, environmental damage, and limited economic opportunity. Artisan miners, who produce over 20% of the DRC’s cobalt, frequently earn less than $2 per day despite gruelling and dangerous conditions. In mining territories, there are high rates of severe malnutrition among children under five, many children are out of school, and there is unbearable degradation of water ecosystems and rain forests. Child and forced labour are extensively used in cobalt extraction. This pursuit of critical minerals, especially by foreign actors operating with limited accountability and often in violation of local laws, creates a holistic humanitarian and ecological crisis. The economic exploitation is inextricably linked to egregious human rights violations and irreversible environmental damage, trapping communities in a cycle of profound poverty and vulnerability, making them highly susceptible to recruitment by armed groups or displacement.

Conflicts in eastern DRC stem from a complex interplay of ethnic tensions, such as those linked to the 1994 Rwandan Genocide and the dynamics between Bantu farmers and Nilotic herders, alongside political and corporate corruption, and the lingering effects of Western colonialism. The involvement of foreign entities, including Chinese nationals, in these operations strains local communities and intensifies existing tensions. Foreign mining interests do not typically

create these deep-seated ethnic or tribal divisions. Instead, they operate within and often exacerbate pre-existing, deeply rooted ethnic, political, and historical grievances. By providing financial and material support to armed groups, engaging in illegal operations, and exploiting weak governance, these external actors provide the means and incentives for pre-existing tensions to escalate into violent, prolonged conflicts, turning resource wealth into a curse for local populations and making genuine peace building efforts significantly more challenging.

Table 2: Chinese Investment in African Critical Mineral Sectors (2000-2022)

Metric	Statistics
Total Chinese Investment in African Mining (by 2022)	US$9.76 billion
% of China’s Total FDI in Africa	23.8%
China’s Share of African Mine Production (Current)	~8%
% Increase in Chinese-Owned Mines (since 2019)	21.3%
China’s Global Market Share of Refined Cobalt	67%
Chinese Ownership/Stakes in DRC Cobalt Mines	15 of 19

This table illustrates the sheer scale and strategic concentration of China’s influence in Africa’s critical minerals sector, providing crucial context for its role in exacerbating conflict and poverty. The figures clearly demonstrate China’s significant financial commitment and its growing control over key mineral resources in Africa, particularly cobalt, which is vital for global technology. This economic dominance provides the backdrop against which allegations of illegal mining, financing of armed groups, and human rights abuses become more understandable, showing the immense leverage China wields. The data underscores Africa’s increasing reliance on Chinese investment and market access for its mineral wealth, which can perpetuate economic dependency and the “resource curse.” By quantifying the extent of China’s footprint, the table provides concrete evidence to support the arguments about how this engagement fuels poverty and conflict.

IV. Japan’s Engagement in Africa: Development, Fisheries, and Emerging Interests

Japan’s engagement in Africa is characterised by a different approach compared to China, often emphasising development cooperation and strategic partnerships. While its direct links to fuelling poverty and conflict through tariffs or sea resource grabs are less explicit in the provided information, its activities in fisheries still contribute to pressures on marine ecosystems, and its broader development model faces scrutiny.

A. Trade and Economic Partnerships (TICAD)

The Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) serves as Japan’s primary multilateral platform for dialogue and action on African development, emphasising “African ownership and international partnership”. At TICAD 2022, Japan pledged an additional $30 billion in aid to Africa over three years, focusing on economic development (including private sector assistance), social programs (health, education), and peace and security initiatives. Japan aims to transition “beyond traditional aid models” toward “solution-oriented and business-driven partnerships,” recognising Africa’s potential.

Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) between Japan and African countries are considered crucial for unlocking investment flows by providing comfort to investors through international dispute resolution mechanisms. However, only five African governments have signed BITs with Japan to date, despite ongoing negotiations. The low adoption rate of BITs could be a significant impediment to attracting the kind of large-scale, secure Japanese private sector investment that could genuinely contribute to sustainable economic diversification and poverty reduction in Africa. Without these legal protections, Japanese companies might remain cautious, limiting the flow of capital and technology that could offer a viable alternative to less transparent or more exploitative investment models. This suggests a missed opportunity for Japan to solidify its “alternative” role and more effectively contribute to long-term stability.

Japan’s Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) scheme offers reduced tariffs or duty-free treatment for designated imports from developing countries, including Least Developed Countries (LDCs), aiming to boost their export income and industrialisation.

Despite these efforts, TICAD has faced criticism for being “outdated,” “transactional,” and not fully aligned with Africa’s Agenda 2063, which emphasises self-reliance. Critics argue that Japan’s investments often lack long-term sustainability and local capacity building, and that the focus on short-term, sector-specific projects may not address the root causes of challenges like governance and inequality. Despite Japan’s stated intentions and its comparatively smaller trade volume, its development cooperation model has not fully transitioned from a donor-recipient paradigm to one of true, empowering partnership. This limitation means that while Japan’s engagement is less directly implicated in fuelling conflict through illicit means, its current approach may not be robust enough to significantly counteract the systemic issues of poverty and dependency exacerbated by other, more exploitative foreign actors, thereby indirectly contributing to the overall vulnerability of African nations.

B. Fishing Activities and Local Impacts

Japan, alongside the EU and China, has negotiated fisheries agreements allowing its boats access to West African waters, which contributes to “unsustainable pressures on limited fish stocks”. While foreign access agreements provide much-needed income to coastal states, they also lead to over fishing, a problem exacerbated by improvements in fishing gear. This creates a “vicious cycle” of fewer fish and increased pressure on marine resources.

Japanese bilateral aid to the fishing sector, such as that provided to small island states in the Eastern Caribbean, while substantial (representing 1-2% of some islands’ annual GDP), showed “contradictory results” on catch evolution. This aid enabled increased catches with modern vessels but also “marginalised the populations of fishermen from the traditional sector”. A critical observation is that this aid often lacked sociological studies on the affected populations, failing to assess their needs, behaviour, and capacity to adapt to change. This illustrates that even seemingly benevolent foreign aid, when designed and implemented without a deep understanding of local socio-economic structures and community needs, can inadvertently exacerbate poverty and social stratification. By favouring industrialisation or modernisation over traditional practices, such aid can disrupt existing livelihoods, create economic disparities, and generate resentment within communities, thereby contributing to the very conditions of discontent and vulnerability that can fuel internal conflicts, even if not directly leading to “tribal warfare.”

The depletion of fish stocks, to which Japan’s fishing activities contribute, leads to increased frequency and severity of conflicts between local and foreign fleets. West Africa is identified as a “future fisheries conflict hotspot” due to depleted fish stocks from IUU fishing. This indicates that Japan, even through legitimate and negotiated fishing agreements, is part of the collective foreign pressure on finite African marine resources. This over-fishing, regardless of the actor’s intent or the legality of the initial agreement, contributes to resource scarcity. This scarcity, in turn, intensifies competition over dwindling resources, increasing the likelihood of direct clashes between local and foreign fleets and exacerbating the conditions for broader instability and poverty among fishing communities.

C. Sea Mineral Interests

Japan is pioneering deep-sea rare earth extraction efforts, but these are currently planned for its own Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) near Minamitori Island in the Pacific Ocean, at depths of 5,000-6,000 meters. The primary motivation for Japan’s deep-sea mining initiative is to secure a stable domestic supply of critical minerals and reduce reliance on foreign imports, particularly from China, thus enhancing national security.

Concerns exist regarding the environmental impacts of deep-sea mining and the current “legal vacuum” in international waters, with scientists calling for moratoriums until impacts are better understood. There is no evidence in the provided information of Japanese deep-sea mineral extraction activities in African waters or their direct link to fuelling poverty or conflict in Africa. However, critical minerals are an increasing area of interest for Japan in Africa. This intensifying global competition for critical minerals, even if currently focused elsewhere for Japan, suggests that African sea mineral resources (should they be discovered or become economically viable) could become future targets for exploitation by various global powers, including Japan. If not governed transparently and equitably, such future resource grabs could replicate the land-based “resource curse” dynamics and fuel new forms of poverty and conflict in African coastal or maritime zones.

V. The Interplay: Fuelling Poverty and Conflict in Africa

The combined effects of foreign resource extraction and trade policies, particularly China’s aggressive approach, intersect with Africa’s inherent vulnerabilities, creating a potent environment that fuels poverty and escalates conflicts. This dynamic is not merely a sum of individual impacts but a complex interplay of economic, social, and political factors.

A. Economic Dispossession and Deepening Poverty

Foreign resource extraction frequently perpetuates the “resource curse,” where countries rich in resources remain poor due to exploitation and a lack of local benefit. For example, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), with an estimated $24 trillion in natural resources, has a population among the poorest in the world, with the majority not benefiting from this immense wealth. This situation is observed as a manifestation of “neo-colonialism,” where powerful nations and corporations exert control, leading to foreign control of key industries, manipulation of local politics, and exploitation of resources without accountability. China’s economic model in Africa is explicitly described as reinforcing a “neo-colonial presence” that drains the continent’s wealth.

A critical observation is the systemic perpetuation of poverty through value chain dispossession. African countries remain heavily reliant on exporting raw materials, such as cobalt and oil, with minimal local processing or value addition. Foreign corporations often dominate the extraction process, and their profits “outstrip contributions to the local economy and infrastructure”. China’s dominance in

refined cobalt further illustrates that higher-value processing occurs outside Africa. This means that foreign resource engagement, particularly when it focuses predominantly on the extraction and export of raw materials without significant investment in local processing, manufacturing, and diversified industries, actively prevents African nations from capturing higher value in global supply chains. This “value chain dispossession” entrenches economic dependency, limits job creation to low-wage primary extraction, and ensures that the vast majority of wealth generated from Africa’s resources primarily benefits external actors. This systematically perpetuates and deepens poverty, rather than alleviating it, by hindering genuine economic transformation and self-sufficiency.

In the mining sector, local communities receive minimal benefits, facing poor working conditions, environmental damage, and limited economic opportunity. Artisan miners in the DRC, for instance, earn less than $2 per day. In the fishing sector, IUU fishing by foreign fleets leads to significant financial losses ($2.3-$10 billion annually) and massive job losses (300,000 jobs) for West African coastal states. This directly impacts food security, with increased household hunger and reduced dietary diversity.

Beyond direct economic metrics like income and job losses, the information reveals a profound impact on the social and human development of affected communities. In mining areas, there are reports of “severe malnutrition among children under five,” “many children are out of school,” and “unbearable degradation of water ecosystems”. The prevalence of “child and forced labor” in cobalt extraction is also highlighted. In fishing communities, there is a decline in perceived quality of life, increased household hunger, and decreased women’s dietary diversity. This indicates that foreign resource extraction, especially when illicit or poorly regulated, does not merely reduce income; it actively erodes the fundamental social fabric and human capital base of affected communities. By disrupting access to education, undermining health outcomes, and destroying environmental resources essential for life, it creates a multi-generational trap of poverty and vulnerability. This systemic breakdown of social welfare makes communities more susceptible to instability, recruitment by armed groups, and forced displacement, thereby creating fertile ground for the ignition or exacerbation of conflicts.

B. Resource Competition and Conflict Escalation

Competition for vital resources, including minerals, land, water, and fish, is a fundamental driver of armed conflict, often exacerbated by underlying ethnic animosities and historical grievances.

In the mining sector, conflicts in the DRC are directly fuelled by competition for valuable mines, with armed groups and ethnic militias profiting from extraction and smuggling to finance their operations. The involvement of foreign entities, including Chinese nationals, in illegal mining operations strains local communities and intensifies tensions. Conflicts in eastern DRC are explicitly linked to ethnic tensions (e.g., Hutu-Tutsi dynamics) and political/corporate corruption.

Fisheries conflicts are increasing in frequency and intensity globally, driven by declining fish populations, illegal fishing, foreign fishing, and weak governance. West Africa is identified as a “future fisheries conflict hotspot” due to overfishing by foreign industrial trawlers. Direct clashes between small-scale artisan fishing boats and large industrial trawlers are common, involving ramming, net damage, and water cannons. The presence of foreign fishers and illegal fishing are key drivers of conflict in regions like the Horn of Africa and East Africa, leading to fatalities, injuries, and arrests.

Weak governance, a lack of transparency in agreements , and corruption are critical enabling factors for illicit resource extraction and the escalation of conflicts. Political elite competition and loosely defined property rights further exacerbate these issues. Resource scarcity can lead to displacement of populations and push traditional resource-dependent communities into illicit activities like drug smuggling, further destabilising regions.

A crucial observation is the causal loop that connects external exploitation, weak governance, and internal conflict. Foreign exploitation, such as Chinese IUU fishing and illegal mining, is explicitly enabled by “weak enforcement capacity” and “lack of transparency” in host nations. This weak governance is often linked to corruption, where foreign actors make “deals with front companies owned by African elites” to “fund the political party that happens to be in power”. This illicit funding, in turn, empowers armed groups and exacerbates pre-existing ethnic animosities and historical grievances , transforming resource competition into violent, prolonged conflicts. External actors, by exploiting these weaknesses and providing financial and material support to illicit networks and armed groups, actively reinforce the very conditions that lead to poverty and prolonged, often ethnically-tinged, conflicts, making sustainable development and peace building efforts exceptionally challenging.

The information also reveals a broadening spectrum of conflict actors and modalities. Resource-driven conflicts in Africa are not monolithic but manifest in diverse forms and involve a widening array of actors. Beyond traditional “resource wars” over land and minerals , the available data highlights direct “clashes between small-scale and industrial vessels” in fishing and an increase in “piracy and armed robbery at sea”. The actors involved span from local artisan fishers and communities to foreign industrial trawlers, various armed groups (e.g., M23, Raia Mutomboki), ethnic militias, and even government actors. This increasing complexity diversifies the types of conflict, expands the range of actors involved (from localised community disputes to international maritime security concerns), and shifts conflict modalities from purely terrestrial skirmishes to significant maritime insecurity. This increasing complexity makes conflict resolution and peace building efforts significantly more challenging, as they must address both land-based and sea-based dimensions, as well as the intricate, often overlapping, web of state and non-state actors.

Table 3: Key Drivers and Consequences of Fisheries Conflicts in Africa

Drivers	Consequences
Illegal fishing	Fatalities
Foreign fishing	Injuries
Weak governance/lack of transparency	Arrests
Declining fish populations/overfishing	Social unrest/community protests
Limits on access to fishing grounds	Displacement
Criminal activities/piracy	Increased crime/piracy
Resource scarcity/spatial competition	Food insecurity
	Livelihood loss/job loss

This table provides a structured and comprehensive overview of the dynamics of fisheries conflicts, directly addressing the query’s focus on conflict escalation. By distinctly categorizing drivers and consequences, the table offers a clear analytical framework for understanding the complex causal relationships that lead to and result from fisheries disputes. It synthesizes information from various sources across different African regions, providing a holistic picture of the multifaceted challenges faced by African fishing communities due to foreign and internal pressures. Each driver and consequence listed directly relates to the user’s query about poverty and conflict, demonstrating the immediate and profound impact of these issues on African populations. The explicit inclusion of “weak governance” and “lack of transparency” as key drivers underscores the systemic vulnerabilities that enable foreign exploitation and internal conflicts, pointing towards areas for potential intervention.

VI. Conclusion and Recommendations

The analysis demonstrates that the engagement of China and, to a lesser extent, Japan with Africa’s resources and trade significantly contributes to the continent’s challenges of poverty and conflict. China’s impact is more directly linked to illicit activities, extensive resource depletion, and the fueling of armed groups, while Japan’s legitimate, yet sometimes misaligned, development and fishing activities also contribute to overall pressures on African resources and livelihoods. The pervasive “resource curse” and weak governance structures in Africa are critical enabling factors for external exploitation and internal conflict. Both resource abundance, which attracts exploitation, and resource scarcity, which drives local competition, contribute to instability. The problem is exacerbated by neo-colonial dynamics that perpetuate economic dependency and dispossession.

Summary of Challenges:

• China’s Role: China’s distant water fishing operations are directly linked to illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, resulting in significant job losses, financial losses (estimated at $2.3 billion to $10 billion annually), and exacerbating food insecurity and maritime insecurity, including piracy. Its dominant role in land-based mineral extraction, particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo, is directly connected to financing armed groups, perpetrating human rights abuses (including child and forced labor), and causing severe environmental degradation. These activities collectively deepen poverty and fuel ethnic and communal conflicts. While China’s trade model offers opportunities, it also risks deepening dependency on raw material exports and hindering local industrialization.
• Japan’s Role: Japan’s fishing activities contribute to unsustainable pressure on fish stocks through legitimate agreements, which, in turn, intensifies competition over dwindling resources and increases the potential for conflict. Its development aid, while substantial, is criticized for being transactional, lacking long-term sustainability, and failing to adequately build local capacity or fully align with Africa’s self-reliance goals. Japan’s emerging interest in deep-sea minerals is currently focused outside Africa, but this global competition for critical resources highlights a future potential for similar resource-related challenges on the continent if not managed proactively and equitably.
• Overarching Issues: The core challenges stem from the “resource curse” itself, where Africa’s wealth does not translate into widespread prosperity for its people. This is compounded by weak governance, corruption, and a lack of transparency in resource management, which create an environment ripe for external exploitation. Both the allure of abundant valuable resources and the desperation caused by resource scarcity drive conflict, often exploiting pre-existing ethnic and communal tensions.

Recommendations:

To mitigate these complex challenges and foster sustainable development and peace in Africa, a multi-pronged approach involving African governments, foreign partners, and international organizations is essential.

• For African Governments:
  • Strengthen Governance and Transparency: Implement robust legal frameworks, enhance regulatory oversight, and combat corruption in both fisheries and mining sectors to ensure transparent and accountable resource management.
  • Enhance Maritime Security: Invest in and build capacity for effective maritime law enforcement and surveillance to combat IUU fishing within their Exclusive Economic Zones.
  • Renegotiate Resource Agreements: Re-evaluate and renegotiate existing resource agreements to ensure equitable benefit sharing, promote local value addition through processing and manufacturing, and prioritize local employment opportunities.
  • Prioritize Local Communities: Mandate and conduct thorough socio-economic and environmental impact assessments before approving any foreign resource projects, ensuring that local community needs and traditional livelihoods are protected and benefit directly.
  • Diversify Economies: Actively pursue economic diversification strategies beyond raw material exports to reduce vulnerability to global commodity price fluctuations and build more resilient economies.
  • Foster Regional Integration: Strengthen regional cooperation and integration initiatives, such as the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), to enhance collective bargaining power, develop internal markets, and create shared prosperity.
• For China and Japan (and other foreign partners):
  • China: Increase transparency in distant water fishing operations and hold fleets accountable for illegal activities, including “saiko” fishing. Cease all forms of support, direct or indirect, to armed groups in mineral-rich regions, and ensure that supply chains are free from conflict minerals. Adhere strictly to international labor and environmental standards in all resource extraction activities, eliminating child and forced labor. Shift from a predominant raw material extraction model to one that actively supports local value addition, industrialization, and technology transfer.
  • Japan: Ensure that development aid and investment are truly aligned with African self-reliance goals, such as Agenda 2063, and prioritize long-term capacity building and sustainable development over short-term, transactional projects. Increase the signing and effective implementation of Bilateral Investment Treaties to provide a more secure and predictable framework for sustainable private sector engagement. Support African efforts to combat IUU fishing and promote sustainable fisheries management practices that benefit local communities.
• For International Organizations and Civil Society:
  • Support Governance Strengthening: Provide technical assistance and financial support to African nations to strengthen governance, legal frameworks, and enforcement capacities in their resource sectors.
  • Promote Responsible Sourcing: Advocate for and promote global standards for responsible sourcing of minerals and seafood, with robust traceability and certification mechanisms to prevent illicit trade and human rights abuses.
  • Facilitate Dialogue: Facilitate multi-stakeholder dialogues, including Track II dialogues, involving governments, civil society, and local communities, to address resource conflicts and ensure equitable and sustainable solutions.
  • Deepen Conflict Research: Increase research into the specific ethnic and communal dimensions of resource conflicts to inform more targeted and effective peacebuilding initiatives, recognizing the complex interplay of factors beyond mere economic competition.

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